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Abstract Living artworks created with biotechnology
raise a range of ethical questions, some of which are
unprecedented, others well known from other contexts.
These questions are often discussed within the frame-
work of bioethics, the ethics of the life sciences. The
basic concern of institutionalised bioethics is to develop
and implement ethical guidelines for ethically responsi-
ble handling of living material in technological and
scientific contexts. Notably, discussions of ethical issues
in bioart do not refer to existing discourses on art and
morality from the field of aesthetics. The latter frame-
work is primarily concerned with how the moral value
of an artwork affects its artistic value. The author argues
that a successful integration of these two frameworks
will make possible an ethics of bioart that is adequate to
its subject matter and relevant for practice. Such an
integrated approach can give increased depth to under-
standings of ethical issues in bioart, inspire new ways of
thinking about ethics in relation to art in general and
give novel impulses to bioethics and technology assess-
ment. Artworks by the Tissue Culture and Art Project
and their reception serve as the empirical starting point
for connecting perspectives in art with those of bioeth-
ics, developing an ethics for bioart. The author suggests
that consideration of the effect of these artworks is vital
in validating ethically problematical applications of
biotechnology for art. It is argued that the affective,
visceral qualities of living artworks may spur the audi-
ence to adjust, revise or develop their personal ethical
framework.
Keywords Bioethics . Art andmorality . Bioart .
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Introduction
In the last three decades, biotechnological techniques
and methods have increasingly been used for non-
scientific and non-corporate purposes such as citizen
science, biohacking, design and art. Today, hundreds
of artists around the world use the different techniques
of biotechnology, be it tissue culture, genetics or syn-
thetic biology. These new media for art bring with them
a whole new set of ethical issues not heretofore brought
up in discussions of ethics in the context of art, as well as
some that are unprecedented in discussions of the
biotechnosciences.
Many artists explicitly seek to engage in the discus-
sion of such issues. Sometimes, that very concern gen-
erates artworks that are themselves ethically problemat-
ic. This has led to a flourishing ethical discussion in
relation to Bbioart^. Bioart refers and may bring atten-
tion not just to biotechnology as a problematic but to
wider biopolitical issues such as human beings’ rela-
tionships with other living things, human enhancement,
the future of food production and the very notion of
Btechnological fixes^ to the Bwicked^ problems of our
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time. As such, it is part of an emerging range of
technoscientific artefacts and activities—also including
those of nanotechnology—that have a direct impact on
society and speak to the direction in which we are
collectively moving. Bioart, I will argue, can serve as a
form of material technology assessment, but this does
not exhaust its potential.
Discussions about bioart are often framed within the
context of bioethics (see e.g. [42, 78]).1 This is under-
standable, since bioartworks are often presented as
Bresponding to issues raised by biotechnology^ ([43],
p. 200),2 indicating that their interest lies primarily in
how they relate to the life sciences and bioethical ques-
tions regarding, for instance, the proper use of living
materials. William Myers has recently argued that the
Btension between bioethics and technology is likely to
underpin the most significant cultural developments of
our age, and so the language of the life sciences—
broadly speaking, and including its symbols, protocols,
and objects—offers a rich communication tool for artists
to use in probing our shifting ideas of identity^ ([48], p.
14). However, bioethics is poorly suited for art-specific
questions, which are also often posed in discussions of
bioart. Whereas bioethical questions such as Bhow
should we relate to other living beings^ are indeed
important aspects of many bioartworks, the reception
of such art is dependent on the audience’s individual
ideas of what art should do, and according to which
parameters it should be judged.
This is further illustrated by the fact that other Bfringe
biotechnology^ activities,3 although in practice often
performed by some of the same actors for instance
within community laboratories, are largely treated with-
in a different ethical framework, emphasising biosafety
and biosecurity (see e.g. [7, 25, 61]). Considering how
closely interlinked they are as approaches to biotechnol-
ogy, it is interesting to see how different discussions
about the ethics of DIYbio and especially biohacking,
with its connotations to Bblack-hat^ computer hackers,
are from discussions about bioart. Especially
considering that the most publicised instance of a non-
scientist being arrested on suspicion of bioterror intent is
that of artist Steve Kurtz of the Critical Art Ensemble
(see e.g. [46]), this is a striking example of how differ-
ently scholars and the general public deal with art, as
opposed to other fringe biotechnology approaches.
In this paper, I argue that a richer understanding may
be reached if we connect the ethical questions implicitly
or explicitly raised by bioart to the question of what art
can do, and more specifically how art is received.4 I
propose, therefore, that insights from existing discus-
sions of ethics in art can serve as tools for analysis of
how one’s view of art will affect one’s response to
bioethical questions posed in the context of bioart.
Concurrently, art and morality discourses within aes-
thetics may benefit from the consideration of a new
range of ethical issues. Since, as is argued by Myers
[48] and Yetisen et al. [74], an increasing number of
artists will be working in labs in the years to come,
insight into ethical issues arising from such work is
urgently needed.
The empirical focus in this paper is on the scholarly
reception of artworks byOron Catts, Ionat Zurr and their
collaborators in the Tissue Culture and Art Project
(TC&A).5 This choice is based partly on my case study
at the SymbioticA Centre in Perth,6 where Catts and
Zurr are based, and partly on the wide range of different
responses generated by these artworks. After introduc-
ing the TC&A, I describe the categories of moralism,
autonomism and contextualism, which have been iden-
tified as representing different approaches to art and
morality, or, on a more fundamental level, to the role
of art in society. These perspectives have not been
extensively applied in relation to bioart. In the following
1 The anthology Signs of Life: Bio Art and Beyond [40] has a
section on Bbioethics^, including a chapter by bioethicist Cary
Wolfe, and another anthology on the topic, entitled Tactical
Biopolitics: Art, Activism, and Technoscience [20] includes chap-
ters categorised under the headline Bbiosecurity and bioethics^,
notably one by Paul Rabinow and Gaymon Bennett.
2 Levy discusses Bethical issues^ as such and does not refer to the
term bioethics, or to any other ethical framework, in this article.
3 N. S. Vaage forthcoming: Fringe Biotechnology: DIYbio, Art,
and Other Approaches at the Institutional Outskirts.
4 As has been pointed out repeatedly in recent years (see, e.g.
[50]), art theorists are becoming less concerned with definitions of
art and more with its functions, its effects—precisely this question
of what art can do.
5 This article is focused on a small range of Bliving^ artworks
created using biotechnology. However, the category of Bbioart^ is
quite heterogeneous, and many scholars include such different
activities as genetic portraits (Marc Quinn, Iñigo Manglano-
Ovalle) and bacterial paintings (David Kremer), interactive do-it-
yourself workshops (Reiner Maria Matysik, SymbioticA, the
Waag Society), bioelectronics (Hackteria) and certain types of
body art (Stelarc, Orlan, Art Orienté Objet) in the term (see, e.g.
[31, 46]).
6 The case study, performed in February–May 2013, included
semi-structured interviews with the involved artists and biologists,
in addition to participant observation, archival studies andmaterial
study of documentation of the artworks.
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section, I introduce the field of bioethics. Finally, I
discuss whether and how the combination of these ethics
can inform one another, taking into consideration a
range of aspects of the aforementioned artworks and
their reception in light of this new, interwoven frame-
work.7 I will argue in favour of a contextualist position
that considers each artwork in relation to its context, and
in order to accentuate this point, I also draw on other
artworks in the discussion.
While the bioethical questions often posed with re-
gard to bioartworks are important, the affective impact
they may have upon the viewer is perhaps even more
important in relating to these pieces as art. Considering
what art can do, I suggest that in the case of visceral,
living artworks, the embodied response can induce re-
flection on the technologies in question and on our
relationship to other living beings. This broaches the
possibility that some bioartworks may contribute some-
thing to individuals’ ethical frameworks that might not
be attained through other sources.
Pig Wings and Extra Ears: Living Bioartworks
Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr started working with biology
in 1996, developing the TC&AProject based on the idea
of using mammalian tissue culturing techniques to grow
artworks. One of their early works, developed in collab-
oration with Guy Ben-Ary, as well as numerous scien-
tific advisors including Joseph Vacanti, was the Pig
Wings (2000–2002), three sets of Bwings^ grown from
pig mesenchymal cells (bone marrow stem cells) on
degradable biopolymers, in the shape of bird, bat and
pterosaur wings. The piece played on how various crea-
tures have been pictured with wings throughout history
and how different types of wings indicated whether the
figure was good (typically bird wings, as on angels and
pegasuses) or bad/satanic (bat wings) (Fig. 1a). Another
reference was the idiom Bwhen pigs fly ,^ indicating
something near impossible. With an ironic twist, the
artists sought to show the limitations as well as the
possibilities of current biotechnology [1]. The tissue
sculptures, far from being actual flying pigs, measured
only 4×2×0.5 cm each [18], and the artists state that
they del iberately adopted an Baesthet ics of
disappointment^, counteracting the current hype of bio-
technology (Fig. 1b).
For Pig Wings and other projects such as their Semi-
Living Worry Dolls (2000), the TC&A engaged the
audience explicitly in the liveness of their tissue-
engineered artworks through their Bfeeding^ and
Bkilling^ rituals. They Beuthanized^ the living artworks
by exposing them to the non-sterile conditions of the
world outside of petri dishes and incubators, allowing
audience members to touch them with their (gloved)
hands [15]. In contrast to the brightly coloured, large-
scale photographic documentation of the Pig Wings, the
(semi-)living, diminutive wings, consisting of stem cells
subsisting in vitro without an immune system, shown in
the gallery inside a rotating bioreactor contained in an
incubator, were frail enough that contact with the out-
side world was in itself enough to kill them. The TC&A
emphasised the necessity of consciously killing the cells
themselves and allowing the audience to take part, Bas
there is usually no one who is willing to ‘adopt’ the
semi-living entities^ ([15], p. 239). In their killing rit-
uals, although stressing their responsibility for their
creations as well as elevating their Bsemi-living^ crea-
tures to a status of subjecthood, the artists also pointed
out that Byou might be killing more cells when you
brush your teeth in the morning^.8
In 2003, Catts and Zurr collaborated with perfor-
mance artist Stelarc to create an Extra Ear ¼ Size
(Fig. 2), referencing the 1997 project in which Joseph
Vacanti of Harvard Stem Cell Institute and his team had
used tissue engineering to grow what looked like a
human ear at the back of a mouse [9]. Using Stelarc’s
left ear as a model, the artists grew an ear-shaped sculp-
ture, but a quarter of the original size. While Stelarc’s
intention was for the ear to be attached to his arm and
made to emit sounds rather than receive them (he later
had a full-sized ear surgically sculpted onto his left arm),
exploring the phenomenon of excess in human enhance-
ment [65], Catts and Zurr were interested in this body
part as questioning Bnotions of the wholeness of the
body^ ([18], p. 27, see also [12]).
Since the early 2000s, Catts and collaborators such as
Gary Cass and Stuart Hodgetts have also run a number
of DIY biotech workshops, mainly for artists, but also
for other interested parties, which again demonstrates
that the boundaries between art and DIY are far more
blurry in practice than in theoretical discussions. In7 I analyse the academic reception of bioart, in which ethical issues
have been discussed at some length. The same approach could
well be used, for instance, to analyse audience or media reception. 8 Personal conversation with Oron Catts, April 2013.
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2006, TC&A developed theDIYDe-victimizer Kit Mark
One (DIYDVKm1), with the intention of extending Bthe
life of parts of^ deceased animals. The stated objective
for this piece was to Ballay some of the guilt people feel
when they consume parts of dead animals^ ([14], p. 18).
Maciej Ożóg ([51], p. 51) observes that the death of the
animals Bbecomes meaningful only in the context of the
bad feelings felt by the perpetrators of the tragedy ,^ as
this Bre-life-ing^ does nothing for the (already dead)
animal in question.
Catts and Zurr have published extensively in aca-
demic journals about their artworks, their ironic inten-
sions and how they speak to current developments in the
biotechnosciences. They repeatedly stress their concern
(see e.g. [16, 18]) with how life is increasingly seen as
raw material to be manipulated, and explicitly seek to
debunk what they call the Bsingle engineering
paradigm^, the Bapplication of real engineering logic
onto life^ ([17], p. 28).9 Their artworks, on the other
hand, are much more ambiguously presented. Some
commentators have, however, deemed their approach
ethically problematic. The following sections discuss
different moral stances described within the ethical crit-
icism of art and bioethics, which will aid our interpreta-
tion of how the two are connected in the reception of
bioartworks.
Moralism, Autonomism, Contextualism
The ethical importance of art has been discussed at least
since the Ancient Greeks. Plato [52] was suspicious of
the potential of poetry, painting and sculpture to sway
people’s emotions, leading them away from the search
for truth. Aristotle [3], on the other hand, emphasised
the power of tragedy, in particular, to bring enlighten-
ment through contemplation of an exemplary story.
Although differing in their view of the value of art,10
they both evaluated it from what we would call a mor-
alist point of view.
Fig. 1 Tissue Culture and Art
Project, Pig Wings, 2000–2001.
Pig mesenchymal cells (bone
marrow stem cells) grown over
biodegradable polymers.
a Photographed under coloured
light: red bat wings, blue bird
wings and green pterosaur wings.
b The Bbat^ (left) and Bbird^
(right) wings in their culture
vessels. Photo credits: Tissue
Culture and Art Project.
Reproduced with permission
from the artists
Fig. 2 Tissue Culture and Art Project, Extra Ear ¼ Size, 2003.
Photo credits: Tissue Culture and Art Project. Reproduced with
permission from the artists
9 In recent years, the artists have focused more on the origins of
life, Bthe substrate^, and the historical background of the engineer-
ing approach to biology in pieces such as Crude Matter (2012)
and, with Corrie van Sice, TheMechanism of Life—After Stéphane
Leduc (2013).
10 The use of the term Bart^when discussing the ancient Greeks is,
of course, an anachronism, as their concepts of techne and poiesis
did not carry the same connotations as our contemporary concep-
tion of art.
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Moralists hold that art is subject to the same laws and
norms as other activities in society. A moralist perceives
the morality of art as having a direct impact on its
aesthetic value. In other words: if an artwork is Bmorally
defective^, it must be aesthetically flawed, too. The
novel Lolita (1955) by Vladimir Nabokov is often men-
tioned as an example of the problem of moralism (see
e.g. [11]). The formally exquisite prose of the book
stands in stark contrast to its storyline about an unrepen-
tant paedophile. A moralist would have to condemn it as
artistically flawed, despite its aesthetical qualities.
Similarly, Andres Serrano’s aesthetically striking,
large-scale photograph Piss Christ (1987), which was
created by submerging a plastic crucifix in a tank of the
artist’s urine, has been met with charges of blasphemy,
but has also received critical acclaim [62]. Moralists in
the Platonic tradition view immoral art as dangerous
because its aesthetic power might be seductive, whereas
other moralists follow David Hume [36] in arguing that
artworks with immoral contents will not be able to sway
a morally conscious audience and will thus be aesthetic
failures.
In the ethical criticism of art, moralism has long been
considered an opposing tendency to autonomism,11 the
view that ethical and aesthetic criticisms are separate.
Moralism has traditionally been connected to the narra-
tive and didactic power of art, whereas autonomism put
more weight on formal aspects. Throughout the history
of art, these two tendencies have existed side by side;
now one taking precedence, now the other.12 The au-
tonomist view can be found in the statement Bart for art’s
sake^, popular in Modernist art theory.13 The autonomy
of art is directly connected to the idea of Bartistic
license^, that art should be free expression, unlimited
by political and social conventions. R.W. Beardsmore
[6] traced this idea back to Oscar Wilde’s demand that
the critic ought to Brecognize that the sphere of art and
the sphere of ethics are absolutely distinct and separate^
([71], p. 191). An artwork can be ethically defect and
still be aesthetically pleasing, and vice versa. Kieran
Cashell points out that since autonomism does not ac-
knowledge that works of art can validly possess ethical
significance, it Bis compelled to treat any works that do
as hybrid deviations, as art mutations that cannot be
considered purely artistic^ ([11], p. 28). This is an
inherently formalist view.
Autonomism comes up short when confronted with
certain artworks whose moral and societal relevance is
simply too great an aspect to be ignored. For instance, in
The Reincarnation of St Orlan (1990–92) performance
artist Orlan underwent a series of plastic surgeries to
attain features from art historical models of beauty,
including the brow of Leonardo’s Mona Lisa. The sur-
geries were staged as performances; Orlan was placed in
a cruciform position, reading themed poetry during the
procedure, which was filmed in its entirety. This project
is an uncompromising confrontation with Western
ideals of beauty, and as such, it may serve to discourage
women from undergoing such surgical procedures [11].
A judgement of the artwork solely from an autonomist
perspective (is the surgery performance and resulting
facial and bodily features aesthetically interesting?)
would miss the critical edge of this piece and, in the
case of radical autonomism, would consider the work
artistically poorer for containing such a politically
charged message.
Paradoxically, moralists may sometimes be com-
pelled to consider an artwork’s value in formalist terms.
Daniel Jacobson, in BIn Praise of Immoral Art^ [37],
emphasises how Bthe moralist^, when encountering
Bimmoral^ art, must either deny it any aesthetic value
or continue somehow to accept it as art while remaining
unmoved (or repulsed) by its offensive moral message.
If the latter approach is chosen, what remains is a
formalist judgement of the artwork separated from its
content. Anthony Julius concludes that moralists and
artists Bcannot be reconciled, and that there is no third
position available to harmonize the contrary
perspectives^ ([39], p. 9).
Noël Carroll’s [10] Bmoderate^ moralism, however,
hopes to achieve this third way. He suggests that moral
value is not always relevant to the aesthetic value of the
artwork but that morally defective contents may inter-
fere with the audience’s appreciation of it. In other
words, the moral value of a piece may in some cases
directly influence its aesthetic value, which he defines as
the degree to which they absorb us. The intention of the
artist is an important factor to Carroll: if an artwork does
11 What I here term Bautonomism^ is sometimes referred to as
Bformalism^ (a term that also carries other meanings), see, e.g.
[37]. Similarly, in recent years, the term Bethicism^ has partly
taken over for the term moralism, see, e.g. [27].
12 Consider the conflict between the proponents of disegno (draw-
ing/form) and colour in the Italian renaissance.
13 BArt for art’s sake^, a phrase attributed to the early nineteenth
century poet Théophile Gautier, today alludes both to the aesthetic
autonomy of an artwork, suggesting the ideal of pleasure without
interest and no interpretation outside the frames of the picture, and
to the institutional autonomy of the art world.
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not evoke a moral response when one was intended by
its producer, the design of the work is faulty, and the
work itself, therefore, is an aesthetic failure. But, fol-
lowing this logic, a work of art that was not intended to
have a moral impact may well be aesthetically and
artistically successful without arousing moral feelings
in the viewer. In Carroll’s view, artworks that do engage
our moral feelings may thus be evaluated Bin terms of
whether they deepen or pervert the moral understanding^
([10], p. 229). He argues that a moral artwork, when
successful, can contribute to our moral education.
According to Jacobson’s Bimmoralist^ view [27, 37],
moral defects in art need not be aesthetical defects, even
when relevant to the aesthetic judgement of the piece.
They may actually increase its aesthetic value, rather
than subtracting from it. Matthew Kieran argues Bthat
morally defective imaginative experiences, including
taking up attitudes and responding in ways that are
morally problematic, are required to enable one more
fully to understand things than one could otherwise have
done^ ([41], p. 63). This view finds common ground
with moralism in contradicting autonomism’s insistence
that morality should not be taken into account.
Both Jacobson and Carroll’s views are examples of
Bethical pluralism^, a term that refers to any view ac-
knowledging Bthat conflict between mutually opposed
yet equally reasonable attitudes arises because moral
values are neither exclusively oppositional nor com-
mensurate with each other^ ([11], p. 13, see also 10,
37). This relativist approach rests on the assumption that
moral concepts do not apply equally to diverse situa-
tions. Another example of ethical pluralism is what Gaut
[27] has called Bcontextualism^, the view that, occa-
sionally, the unethical aspects of a morally questionable
work may contribute positively to its artistic value. This
term is seen as preferable in that it does not share
immoralism’s implication that moral defects Bare auto-
matically aesthetic merits^ ([11], p. 45).14 Rather, the
Bdeployment of whatever principle may be required in
the particular circumstances^ should be our guide ([11],
p. 46).
The above approaches showcase how the values of
individuals influence their judgement of a work of art.
What I see as the most important part may matter a lot
less to you. How will these differing stances relate to
bioart? Bioartists take widely different approaches, and
their artworks, consequently, bring forth different ethical
issues. On these grounds, I find a contextualist position
to be the most productive perspective. A fundamental
point is that these artworks should be treated locally,
each artwork considered separately for its specific ethi-
cal relevance. In other words, the particular artwork’s
artistic context, its geographical and historical situation,
its relation to the methods used, as well as its political
and societal dimensions, should be taken into account in
the analysis. However, in discussions of ethical issues in
bioart, a tendency of inferring from single artworks to
Bbioart^ as such has so far been only too common (see
e.g. [29, 67]).
Conceptually, a tradition that goes back at least to
Plato has seen aesthetics and ethics as intimately
intertwined, in the search for truth, beauty and goodness.
However, in contemporary art, in contrast to the con-
ventions of earlier times, the aim is rarely to give plea-
sure through the experience of harmonious beauty.
Instead, artists seek to reflect some aspect of human
existence, to provoke, critique or create immersive ex-
periences. Although this can be done within the auton-
omist ideal, a large portion of contemporary artworks
directly engage with issues in society, and most
bioartworks fall within this sphere. Some are explicitly
political and activist, for instance targeting genetically
modified organisms (GMOs), as in Critical Art
Ensemble’s Transgenic Bacteria Release Machine,
which combined two public fears, GM and bacteria,
and sought to inform the public about both. The audi-
ence were left to decide for themselves, based on the
information they were given, whether they wished to
release crippled non-pathogenic gut Escherichia coli
bacteria, transformed with DNA fragments, into the
environment (see e.g. [46]).
Ordinarily, we are made aware of our moral frame-
work only when faced with difficult decisions, whether
as individuals, as representing the interests of individ-
uals (as is often the case for attorneys, next-of-kin, or
GPs), or as a society (in which case politicians, various
experts and NGOs tend to be key players). It can be
argued that experiencing art can create an opportunity to
critically examine or develop that moral framework.
Although this need not be the raison d’être of the art-
work, it can be an important factor for ethical validation.
While discussions of art and morality from aesthetics
scholars can serve to qualify and explain some of the
responses to bioart, there is a good reason why these
14 The explication of these positions must be viewed as a theoret-
ical tool. In real life, a pure immoralist, like a pure moralist or
autonomist, is very rarely to be found.
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artworks are often discussed from the perspective of
bioethics: they touch upon a number of ethical issues
customarily found within that discipline.
Bioethics
It is easy to forget that for many years ethics, like
aesthetics, was a marginalised topic in philosophy.
According to Stephen Toulmin [70], the moral philoso-
phy of the first six decades of the twentieth century
concerned itself more with locating issues of an ethical
nature, rather than with attempting to offer solutions to
those issues. Toulmin argued that it was only when it
became attached to medicine, in the form of bioethics,
that ethics again became a major subject requiring seri-
ous consideration.
Bioethics evolved in order to deal with the particular
set of ethical issues that arose with the advent of modern
biotechnology.15 Van Rensselaer Potter [54] coined the
term in 1971 to mean an interdisciplinary ethics that
would incorporate humanity’s obligations to the total
ecosystem. Since then, it has been defined in a number
of ways by professionals from different disciplines with
divergent interests, so at this point, multiple definitions
of this term coexist.16 Some theorists delineate it as
dealing specifically with the ontological status of the
human, or more narrowly with biomedical issues [26].
Others have challenged what they see as a limiting
anthropocentric model of bioethics, and wished to in-
clude non-human animals in the moral circle [64, 78].
Today, the discipline of bioethics deals first and fore-
most with regulatory frameworks for the life sciences
[72]. Applied bioethics contributes to practical assess-
ment of whether something should or should not be
done, on a case-by-case basis.
Bioethicists typically argue according to one of three
ethical logics: virtue ethics, deontology (duty ethics) or
consequentialist ethics. By far the most common in
institutionalised settings, especially in the USA, is con-
sequentialist arguments, in particular utilitarianism. In
Europe, bioethicists have tended more towards virtue
ethics, which supposes that an action is good if it is
performed for the right reasons, grounded in the notion
of the common good. Deontology, the belief that uni-
versal principles, not the consequences of your actions,
determine what is right, is not uncommon in religious
bioethics and is also sometimes presented in philosoph-
ical perspectives on bioethics, but rarely to be found in
applied, institutionalised settings [30, 78].
As a philosophical tradition, bioethics also treats a
broader range of ethical questions, such as how our
society should relate to the patenting of human genes
and gene therapy, the possibility of neo-eugenics as a
result of the technology to Bpurify^ embryos, issues of
cloning, the use of animals as organ donors and genetic
manipulation in agriculture [24, 56]. Since the late
1990s, bioart has been discussed within this wide defi-
nition of bioethics. However, upon mentioning
Bbioethics^, few writers, whether scholars or artists,
have gone on to define their understanding of the term.
One might speculate whether, in some cases, the very
prefix of Bbio-^ in front of both Bart^ and Bethics^ was
the relevant link.
A deontological ethics requires, in Kantian terms,
that we do not let the ends validate the means.
However, according to consequentialist and virtue eth-
ical perspectives in bioethics, some ends are considered
important enough to justify bending or even breaking
the existing norms (in some cases, laws) for ethical
conduct. Such ends are for instance the curing of major
diseases, ensuring food, water and energy supply and
other goals that impact on the continued existence and
quality of life of a large number of human beings. In
such cases, we find justification for the testing of toxins
on animals, life manipulation and the use of human stem
cells in research, as well as a certain amount of risk. The
more massive the problem, the more we will be willing
to sacrifice our standards of Bdo no harm^ in favour of
the Bgreater good^ (see e.g. [5]).
One of the core philosophical questions of bioethics
is: When do we start to consider a cause important
enough for such waived standards? Clearly, when there
are many human lives at stake. But in most cases, a
scientific research project can hold no guarantee that the
results will indeed save lives—even when this has been
the explicit aim of the research proposal. Furthermore,
multiple branches of what we term Bscientific^ research
can hardly be described as being vital to the wellbeing of
humankind, and many of these can potentially have the
opposite effect. For instance, projects to condition the
15 Engelhardt ([26], p. 95) also argues that the discipline Bcame
into existence to fill the moral and cultural vacuum that resulted
form the deprofessionalization of medicine and the secularization
of the West^.
16 Within the genomic sciences, another term sometimes preferred
is Bgenethics^ [68], and Bneuroethics^ [53] has also been proposed
for the neurosciences.
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movements and behaviour of rodents through brain
microstimulation [69, 73] and insects through neuro-
muscular stimulation (see e.g. [60]) mostly have surveil-
lance applications. Are such forms of research more
morally permissible than artworks that use laboratory
resources, animals or other living materials to create
discussion? Frances Stracey [67] poses the question
whether biotechnology should even be made available
outside the realm of research and industry. What ends
justify the use of living materials and expensive equip-
ment? The answer to this question will, inevitably, vary
according to one’s ethical framework.
Both bioethics and ethics in art deal with the norma-
tive, though with different forms of values. Bioethicist
Paul Macneill and art theorist Bronaċ Ferran
emphasised in the article BArt and Bioethics: Shifts in
Understanding Across Genres^ [44] that both practices
Braise questions about medicine, human composition,
and life—but from different perspectives^, and they
may complement each other. They also argued that
Bbioethics itself may be challenged in that answers that
rely on common-place formulations such as ‘balancing
benefits and harms’ are not so easily applied to aesthetic
projects^ ([44], p. 80). This is a point mentioned by
many scholars discussing bioart (see e.g. [1, 31, 51]).
Macneill and Ferran considered artists to be able to
Bdemonstrably enliven and animate significant topics
and themes, including many of interest to bioethics,
and develop new forms of engagement that allow for
participation and discovery through enactment and em-
bodiment and not just through abstraction or theory^
([44], p. 83). In addition, in contrast Bto the consistent
seriousness of science, medicine and bioethics, their
work can also employ fun, light-hearted or ironic strat-
egies and techniques, although with an equally serious
intent^ (ibid.). As we shall see, the perceived lack of
seriousness has been considered by some as an argu-
ment against any use of living materials in art.
Institutionalised Ethics Meets Bioart
In practice, applied bioethics often takes the form of a
committee deciding whether or not a given research
project should be allowed to proceed. Important in these
decisions is the judgement of whether the perceived
gains outweigh the possible harms of a specific project.
When artists are formally affiliated with a research
institution, as is the case for Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr
from the TC&A, they are subject to the same rules that
apply for scientific researchers.
Catts and Zurr are based at SymbioticA, the world’s
first Centre for Excellence in Biological Arts, situated
within the School of Anatomy, Physiology and Human
Biology at the University of Western Australia (UWA).
When planning a new project, the artists, like any of
their biologist colleagues, have to submit their project
proposal to an ethics committee. This committee nor-
mally consists of medical professionals, perhaps a few
biologists and an ethicist or philosopher.
In the first major project conducted by the artists and
their collaborators at the UWA in the early 2000s, the
ethical committee members were at a loss as to how to
relate to a project with ends they were not set up to deal
with, and deemed themselves unqualified to assess it. In
the end, they decided to Bassess the scientific merits of
the work initially and then to sponsor and initiate debate
on the use of animals for artistic reasons^ ([13], p. 134).
They intended this as a catalyst for a new type of
committee to be convened, in which relevant artistic
expertise would also be included. However, 15 years
later, the projects at SymbioticA are still evaluated by
the same ethical committees. Zurr and Catts [77] argue
that this is unfortunate for artists, as the committees tend
to focus on whether there is a recognisable method and
rigor to the project (there often is not, as artistic research
can proceed along quite different paths). On the other
hand, as some of the biologists connected to
SymbioticA as well as the artists themselves pointed
out in my interviews with them,17 the process of apply-
ing for ethical clearance might help raise the artist’s
awareness of potential dangers, ethical issues and other
aspects of their proposed project. Artist Anna Dumitriu
and ethicist Bobbie Farsides’ edited book Trust Me, I’m
an Artist shows that many artists outside of SymbioticA,
too, have been frustrated with the demands of the sys-
tem. However, the editors argue that B[e]ven when
artists fit into science research groups well and seem to
‘play the game’, their work can raise novel ethical issues
17 Research interviews at SymbioticA, April–May 2013: inter-
viewee 27; 42; 44; 49; 53; 56. Interviewee 28, an artist in resi-
dence, on the other hand, referred to the process as Ba joke^, there
Bto make a broader public feel better about what’s going on^. The
interviewee did add that ethical clearance Bdoes have some pro-
tective boundaries^, but stressed that it Bis not about ideas. I don’t
feel like the ethics department here is interested in what is ethics
per se^.
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specifically because they have become embedded with-
in scientific institutions^ ([22], p. 5).
Bioethics for Bioart, as Seen Through the Prism
of the Ethical Criticism of Art
Discussions of what is at stake in bioartworks tend to
focus on questions such as: Should artists be allowed to
meddle with life? What are the potential implications of
artists letting laboratory life forms into the environment?
Should there be constraints on whether, how and when
artists can use these biotechnologies? (see e.g. [43, 67]).
These questions are, importantly, art-specific. The am-
biguity of art is a common topic in the context of bioart.
Artist and writer Ellen K. Levy [43], in her discussion of
Eduardo Kac’s GFP Bunny (2000, Fig. 3), poses the
question of how much factual information should be
expected from an artwork.GFP Bunny revolved around
presenting a transgenic, glowing green rabbit to the
audience, but the story presented by the artist was met
by a counter-story from the scientist with whom the
artist claimed to have collaborated [34]. Their French
lab did indeed produce rabbits modified with green
fluorescent protein (GFP), but they did not glow the
uniform green of the image Kac presented. What ethical
implications can there be if the rabbit as Kac presented
it, as a creature specifically designed for his art context,
didn’t exist? Levy argues that this specific ambiguity is,
in fact, an ethical problem, and notes that, Ban artist may
be encouraging others to perform genetic manipulations
that he, himself, has neither commissioned nor
undertaken^ ([43], p. 203). Her caution is based on a
(Platonistic) moralist acknowledgement of the harm that
art can do, in this case that members of the audiencemay
be inspired to do something that the artist claims to have
done (but probably did not do).
On the other hand, this very ambiguity may also spur
ethical reflection in viewers. Compared to artworks
presenting explicitly fictional modified creatures, such
as Vincent Fournier’s Post Natural History (2012), a
series of photographic speculations about Bupcoming
species^ inspired by synthetic biology and cybernetics
(including such creatures as BOryctolagus cognitivus^, a
very intelligent rabbit, and the BBuccus magnetica^, a
goat with the ability to control and generate electromag-
netic fields),18 the claim of realness of Kac’s green
bunny seems to have inspired much more media atten-
tion, provocation and also reflection. GFP Bunny did
bring the idea of GFP modification, a common proce-
dure in labs around the world, to a new audience.
Is it acceptable to create ethically dubious artworks, if
they cause an increase in reflexivity and ethical aware-
ness of the issues in question? Art critic and researcher
Annick Bureaud defined bioart as Ban art of belief^, since
verification of the artists’ claims, in a scientific paradigm,
would require repetition of their processes in the same
conditions. She stated that since Bthis is impossible, we
have to ‘believe’ that it is what they say it is—or in some
cases, have our ‘doubts’, given what we know to be
‘possible’. Grasping these works takes knowledge, but
then shouldn’t a citizen be informed?^ [8].
Should we expect a greater degree of documentation,
replicability, security and legitimacy from bioart than
from art using other media? Art historian Frances
Stracey, in an article in Nature Reviews Molecular Cell
Biology, asserted that bioart is Bleast successful, and
most contentious, when the science is reduced to mere
aesthetic spectacle, and no account is taken of the spe-
cific or paradigmatic differences that affect how one
discipline is mediated through another^ ([67], p. 500).
At its best, however, she argued that these artworks can
be Ba provocative reminder that how life is modelled
and represented matters to how it is valued, used and
disposed of^ (ibid.). The view expressed here is implic-
itly moralist and anti-formalist, seeing a potential in art
to foster ethical reflection. Stracey gave two examples of
bioart’s best: Critical Art Ensemble’s Immolation
(2008), which reproduced the effects of incendiary
weapons on skin cells in vitro, juxtaposed with large-
screen war footage, and Natalie Jeremijenko’s OneTree
Fig. 3 Eduardo Kac, GFP Bunny, 2000. Photo credits: Chrystelle
Fontaine
18 Fournier’s piece was exhibited at the Grow Your Own… Life
After Nature exhibition at Science Gallery Dublin, 2013–2014.
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(1998–2001), in which she grew 1000 clones from the
same walnut tree, and showed how they developed
differently as they were planted in different environ-
ments (as pointed out by Jaqueline Stevens [66], due
to random factors, even pairs of cloned trees planted in
the same environment were not identical). However,
Yves Michaud has argued that Jeremijenko’s project
also Bclears cloning of suspicion and trivializes genetic
manipulation^ ([45], p. 393). Jeremijenko originally
wanted to plant all thousand of the trees, in pairs, at
different locations, but had trouble finding suitable sites.
Ellyn Shea [63] in a blog entry noted that the 13 pairs of
trees that were planted in the San Francisco area have
been left without supervision, and that living trees
remained at 9 of the sites. This abandoned Bafterlife^
of the trees shows a difference between flora and fauna:
a similar abandonment of animals would not be so easily
accepted.
Stracey also emphasised that scientists should com-
municate more about their role in these projects. Yetisen
et al. have recently argued that for scientists, while Bthe
criticism and application of science will undoubtedly
continue, perhaps a more profoundly important and yet
less recognized contribution may be the ability of bioart
to help science understand itself^ ([74], p. 732). The
scientific advisor at SymbioticA, Stuart Hodgetts, has
stressed how Bthe way I think about my work has
actually changed^ due to art projects he has contributed
to, in particular interactions with artists who consider
laboratory processes from a different angle. While he
held that his exposure to these artists has given him a
greater appreciation of the everyday creative processes
in the lab, he also described how he and others who
helped the artists at SymbioticAwere Bfrowned upon by
their peers^, who saw it as Bwasting their time, your
time and resources^.19
Lawyer Lori Andrews is one of the few who has
explicitly engaged with the question: BShould life sci-
ence artists be held to higher, the same, lesser, or
different standards than scientists?^ ([1], p. 139). She
contends that artists are Bgenerally held to higher
standards than scientists^ (ibid.), and refers to the
example of artist Anthony Noel-Kelly. In 1998, after
sneaking away cadaver parts from the Royal College
of Surgeons, Noel-Kelly became the first British citi-
zen to be convicted for theft of human remains. As
part of the litigation, the RCS received the moulds and
casts Noel-Kelly had made of the body parts, to be
thereafter included in their anatomical exhibit.
Andrews suggests that the approach of Btreating artists
more harshly than scientists or doctors is suspect^ ([1],
p. 141). She posits that artworks can Bexplain to us
how biotechnologies work^, and also Bprovide us with
the chance to ask: BWhat do we want out of our
biotechnology?^^ ([1], p. 142). At the same time,
she stresses the difference in approaches of artists
dealing with biology, pointing to Hunter O’Reilly’s
painting Madonna con Clone as Bseemingly intended
[…] to promote cloning^, whereas TC&A’s Pig Wings
is presented as an example of artworks aiming to
Bcritically assess the technologies or criticize the man-
ner in which they are being integrated into society^
([1], p. 127). This view of bioart as a form of manifest
vision is an example of ethical pluralism, in a moderate
moralist version resembling Noel Carroll’s perspective
[10]. Andrews suggests that artworks’ function of
allowing us to critically relate to issues around bio-
technology is important and can also Bserve as a guide
to public policy^ ([1], p. 142), by pointing out gaps in
existing regulations and potential societal harm from
technologies. She stresses that there should also be
some legal regulation to prevent artists from crossing
boundaries such as making Bnot a rabbit but a human
glow green, or […] to genetically profile a person
without consent^ (ibid.). This being in place, she
argues, bioart can be used Bto think about the ways
in which people can control the technology, rather than
the technology controlling the people^ (ibid.).
Andrews, with Joan Abrahamson ([2], p. 1) has also
argued, based on a review of Bhundreds of novels, short
stories, representational artworks inspired by genetics and
‘wet works’ […] that artists, even more than scientists, can
make a contribution to the policy surrounding the life
sciences^. This research suggests that art can influence
the governance of science and technology, as well as affect
scientists’ perception of their field. Geneticist Philip R.
Reilly expressed the same idea when he described his first
encounter with Salvador Dalí’s 1963 painting
Galacidalacidesoxyribonucleicacid, a large-scale painting
featuring a crowd of humans holding hands that form a
double helix shape, as the first time he Bseriously thought
about DNA^ ([57], p. xii). Reilly suggested that this
experience from when he was an undergraduate student
invoked his abiding interest in the exploration of DNA in
later years.
19 Research interview with Stuart Hodgetts, SymbioticA, May
2013.
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On the other hand, a range of writers emphasise that
the value of this type of art should not be judged in terms
of scientific gains, or even its capacity for making us
rethink the technologies in question (see e.g. [31, 46]).
Human geographer Deborah Dixon ([21] and media
scholar and artist Maciej Ożóg have argued in similar
veins that the ambiguous, Bliminal ontic status^ of the
TC&A artworks serves to make us Bthink about catego-
ries such as the body, individuality, identity, specific
differences and, last but not least, life itself^ ([51], p.
39).
The artworks’ critical potential and aesthetic value
are seen as interconnected in both of these accounts, in a
positive moralist interpretation of the artworks as con-
veying a moral critique of biotechnologies, but also
potentially a deeper ontological understanding of life
(similar views are found in [4, 59, 78, 79]). Dixon
argues that whereas the work of Critical Art Ensemble,
according to a range of commentators, Bis unquestion-
ably political^ since Bit exposes the realities of global
capitalism and seeks to resist the same^, it is a Bmuch
more contentious issue^ whether more ambiguous work
such as that by TC&A is also defined as political ([21],
p. 416). Dixon suggests that it is, using the extended
meaning of Bpolitical^ presented by Jacques Rancière.
In my contextualist perspective, these considerations are
not mutually exclusive.
Media scholar Carol Gigliotti, on the other hand, has
taken issue with the Babsurdity^ of the simultaneous
wish to make Bhumans part of a broader continuum^
and the TC&A’s manipulation of life forms which, she
claims, Bwill most certainly not contribute to that pro-
ject, but only serve to reinforce it^ ([29], p. 26).20
Gigliotti’s moralist argument touches on important is-
sues of the difficulty of escaping anthropocentrism, and
her questioning of both TC&A and particularly Eduardo
Kac’s claims to anti-anthropocentrism has value.
However, her essay contains a number of odd statements
using terms such as Btransgenic^ and Bbiogenetics^
inaccurately and referring to Catts and Zurr’s work with
tissue cultures as Bgenetic^ art. The artists, in turn, have
criticized Gigliotti’s Bmisunderstanding or sloppy use of
terms^ ([16], p. 129). They describe her approach as an
example of a problematic monodimensional social sci-
ence approach which, contrary to Gigliotti’s explicit
intensions, in the artists’ opinion promotes Ba reduction-
ist view that manipulation of life through modern biol-
ogy happens only at the molecular (genetic) level)^
([16], p. 127). Moreover, they argue that artists’ extend-
ed Bwet^ experience in laboratories can be seen as Ba
political act that goes beyond the democratization of the
technology, to the act of breaking down dominant dis-
courses, dogmas, and metaphors to reveal new under-
stands of life and the power structure it operates within^
([16], p. 140). They posit that bioart such as their own,
Bthat deals with other nongenetic forms of manipulation
can be used as a way to counterbalance the view of life
as determined solely by the DNA code^ ([16], p. 129),
thus countering the genohype [33] perpetuated by many
social scientists. However, the ambiguity of their work
means that it can also be interpreted as having quite
different meanings than the ones they state in their
papers [21]. Also, as Catts and Zurr acknowledge, there
can be little doubt that many artists who are working
with genetics do serve to bolster genohype, through their
interest in DNA as a source of identity (see e.g. [1, 66]).
The range of new ethical challenges in bioart, com-
pared to Btraditional^ art media, naturally entails the
emergence of new questions, and the introduction of
new discussions. So far, however, criticisms of bioart
have often dealt more with the artists’ intentions and
reasonings than with the artworks themselves. While
this is understandable, considering that it offers clearer
statements to argue against, it disregards the idea that the
artworks might well contain issues unthought of by their
makers. Performance and media scholar Kate
Rossmanith has argued that Catts and Zurr, in their
writings, Bsell their work short, for the projects don’t
only work at the level of ideas. Human cells grown into
living, growing sculptures: at stake here is not merely an
idea or a representation of life, but our experience of
being-and-having a body^ [59].
New media scholar Joanna Zylinska [78, 79] has
suggested that the commonly posed questions, e.g. of
artists’ right to manipulate life, while valid, are not Bthe
best questions we can ask about bioart, for the simple
reason that they evoke a normative position on life^
([79], p. 192). In her opinion, bioartistic projects can
serve to Bchallenge the traditional humanist value-based
ethics, where this nebulous entity called ‘human life’ is
posited as a value in advance^ ([79], p. 194). She argues
that bioart has the potential to participate in Bthe
20 Similarly, N. Katherine Hayles asks in the context of Eduardo
Kac’s transgenic bacterial artwork Genesis: BDoes Kac’s interven-
tion in the genetic sequences of bacteria contest the notion that
humans have dominion or reinforce it? The ambiguity inheres in
any artistic practice that uses the tool of the master to gain per-
spective on the master’s house^ ([32], p. 83).
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performative enactment of life as such^ ([79], p. 194),
materially exploring questions such as Bwhat is life?^,
Bwhat is the meaning of life?^ and Bhow do organisms
relate to each other?^ Some TC&A projects, particularly
their feeding and killing rituals, display such
performativity. It is important to realise, however, that
the artworks themselves, while perhaps raising certain
questions in the minds of beholders, leave it up to the
audience to make up their ownminds about the answers.
Zylinska stresses that bioartworks are not nec-
essary to explore such questions, stating that bio-
technology is perfectly capable of posing such
questions from within, and I might add that phi-
losophers of science, bioethicists and other profes-
sionals are also contributing to this discussion.
Notwithstanding, Bbioart is uniquely placed to un-
dertake this kind of questioning knowingly and
purposefully, since it lacks the pragmatic impera-
tive of many science and technology projects,
whereby innovation and economic growth fre-
quently overshadow any non-goal oriented
agendas^ ([79], p. 194). Zylinska argues that art-
ists do take responsibility for life and that they are
materially engaged in Benacting a different ethics
of l i fe^ ( [79] , p. 195) . This view, while
contextualist in the sense of stressing extra-
aesthetic properties of the artworks, stretches the
framework of ethical criticism of art in arguing
that the most interesting questions to pose in rela-
tion to bioart are ontological in nature.
Zy l inska does acknowledge tha t many
bioartworks do not live up to the possibilities that
she sees for the genre, that it is perhaps rare to
find the transformative responsibility for life that
she considers its full potential. This is an impor-
tant point: not all bioartists have the same view of
their own ethical responsibilities, and they have
very different boundaries for what they will and
wil l not do. George Gesser t , one of the
Bgrandfathers^ of bioart, has worked with plants
for decades and explains his choice among other
reasons with there being less serious ethical con-
siderations in working with them: BThe prerequi-
site for conscious experience is a nervous system,
which plants lack. This makes them, along with
fungi, microorganisms, and cells in vitro, invalu-
able materials for artists^ ([28], p. 22). He spec-
ifies that, although there are still ethical consider-
ations, they are not as severe as in working with
mammals. Catts and Zurr, although working with
cells, named in Gessert’s list of Binvaluable
materials^, in turn refer to a sense of discomfort
as an important factor in their work: they state that
they want to work with technologies they are
uneasy with, and seek to spread that unease.21
Philosophers Thomas Brian Mooney and
Samantha Minett, on the other hand, argue in BIf
pigs could fly, should they?^22 that art is not
sufficiently serious a cause for doing any kind of
harm: Baesthetic appreciation may appear frivolous
when calculated against animal suffering^ ([47], p.
632). In their view, the potential benefits of sci-
ence may weigh heavier than concern about animal
welfare, while art cannot offer similar benefits.
They posit that the use of animals for art is mor-
ally suspect, and therefore, all use of animal-
derived cells or DNA is also problematic [47].
However, most ethicists, regardless of their moral
philosophical framework, will agree that there is a
difference in kind as to our responsibilities to
single cells and higher mammals.23 If we take
the common decisive factor of whether or not the
organism involved is capable of feeling pain, cells
without a neural network connected to it would be
excluded from moral consideration. The ethical
issue would concern the inability of the animal
to consent to donating the cell.
The TC&A, when growing, for instance, rat skeletal
muscle in vitro, consider themselves Bscavengers^: they
obtain starter tissue from scientific researchers and do
not biopsy the animals themselves to get the tissue.24 As
such, their responsibility rests in the first instance at the
cell level, since the animal’s tissue was originally har-
vested for science, and the cells cultivated from it exist
independently of its originator. More problematical is
the use of foetal bovine serum (FBS) as the most effec-
tive growth supplement (although alternatives do exist,
see e.g. [35]) for tissue culturing of eukaryotic cells.
FBS is a by-product of the meat industry, produced from
the blood of foetal calves taken from the wombs of
21 Research interviews with the artists at SymbioticA, UWA,
April–May 2013.
22 The title is an explicit reference to Catts, Zurr and Ben-Ary’s
Pig Wings (2001).
23 An exception would be the abortion issue, in which somewould
argue that even the smallest embryo’s potential to become a human
being entitles it to be afforded already the rights of a human being.
24 Research interview with Ionat Zurr at SymbioticA, May 2013.
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butchered cows. As long as FBS is used as a nutrient for
the cells, the resulting products will not be victimless.
Catts and Zurr estimate that Bgrowing around 10 grams
of tissue will require serum from a whole calf (500 ml.),
which is killed solely for the purpose of producing the
serum^ ([16], p. 133).25
The TC&A’s use of FBS does invite the question of
whether the use of biotechnological animal products in
art is morally defensible. If one takes a moralist outlook,
this may be seen as a devaluing factor for the artworks.
However, Btranslating^ to a more traditional artistic
medium, this would also apply to art supplies produced
by child labourers, and paints that cause harm to the
environment. Risks caused by exposure to volatile or-
ganic compounds in producing, handling or interacting
with artworks would arguably fall into the same catego-
ry, but this is rarely mentioned in moralist assessments
of paintings. The ethical discussions of bioart can thus
also point to limitations in the ethics of art: its theoretical
bird’s eye view rarely takes the process of production
into account when judging an artwork, and even moral-
ists relate to the artwork as autonomous in the sense that
it is the content of the artwork itself that is judged as
(im)moral.
Alternatives Instead of Living Art?
Comparative literature scholar Krzysztof Ziarek ([76],
p. 95–96), discussing GFP Bunny, has questioned
Bwhether art is actually needed in order to generate the
kind of discussion, no doubt crucial and imperative, that
has been going on around Kac’s work, or whether those
questions do not in fact arise from the very premises,
objectives, and capabilities of genetic technology .^
Although in some cases, such as genetic privacy and
human cloning, this will clearly be the case, many
emerging technologies and projects go very much
Bunder the radar^ in the public sphere. Despite impor-
tant research conducted in recent years in the fields of
public engagement and science communication, what is
ordinarily being communicated from scientific research
is still the result, not the process of research and the
means employed. Debates are to a large extent carried
out within the research fields, where the parties are
informed on, mostly also have interests in, the issues
in question. Ethicists may be invited in to provide their
Bexpert opinion^ in the discussion, but real public de-
bate on these matters is rarely seen, partly due to the
technical language often used in scientific discourse.
There appears to be little doubt that the affective, mate-
rial connection that art offers can involve new groups in
the discussion. Is this a sufficient justification for it
within a moralist and/or utilitarian framework?
The ethical, societal and cultural issues of biotech-
nology have been dealt with by a number of artists using
Bnon-wet^ media such as painting (Alexis Rockman) or
photography (Vincent Fournier) rather than the methods
of biotechnology itself.26 Ai Hasegawa, in the specula-
tive design piece I Wanna Deliver a Dolphin (2011),
presented a scenario where human beings with adapted
placentas could give birth to endangered dolphin spe-
cies. Using an Banatomical section^ sculpture of the
human womb containing the dolphin foetus, pictures
of a Bdolph-human^ future, and a video of herself
Bgiving birth^ to a dolphin in a swimming pool,
Hasegawa richly explored the potential of such a tech-
nological future using Btraditional^ media (Fig. 4).27 In
addition, of course, bioethicists, philosophers of science
and other academics treat the same issues through verbal
arguments.
So, does the existence of these less ethically problem-
atic alternatives add to the argument that it is morally
indefensible to use bioscientific techniques for the
Bfrivolous^ purpose of art (cf. [47])? Hasegawa is a
graduate of the Royal College of Art’s Design
Interactions programme, in which Anthony Dunne and
Fiona Raby have in the past two decades developed the
approach of Bspeculative design^, which they describe as
being Babout meaning and culture, about adding to what
life could be, challenging what it is, and providing alter-
natives that loosen the ties reality has on our ability to
dream^ ([23], p. 189). Catts and Zurr will, in fact, for the
year of 2016 be visiting faculty at RCA, where Dunne
and Raby stepped down as faculty in 2015. Since their
25 This is not necessarily accurate: FBS is mainly produced in
areas where cattle roam free, and an entire herd is taken to
slaughter at the same time, including some pregnant individuals.
The foetuses, then, are not killed directly for their serum. However,
the process in which the serum is extracted may take more than
30 min, and may quite possibly be painful to the neonates [38].
26 Mitchell [46] has introduced the distinction between
Bprophylactic^ and Bvitalist^ bioart, in which the prophylactic
tactic involves insulating the art and its spectators from the prob-
lematic of biotechnology, critiquing from a distance. Rockman, in
particular, is used as an example of this tactic. On the other hand,
the vitalist tactic involves engagement with biotech from within.
27 The piece was exhibited at the Grow Your Own… Life After
Nature exhibition at Science Gallery Dublin.
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appointment last year, Catts and Zurr, who have previ-
ously stressed that the license that they have to make their
works is also founded in their status as art, have started
defining their practice as Bcontestable design^ [55], sug-
gesting that the boundaries between art and design, as
well, are at present quite malleable. These approaches
are, then, not only similar, but interlinked.
The Bsemi-living^ artworks from the TC&A are strik-
ing in their very live-ness. Oron Catts, in BNot
Moving—Living^ [12], relates a long process of making
their immobile cell creations appear visibly alive. Simply
being told that the artworks were alive did not have the
same affective force. The dampness inside the bioreac-
tors, the shrunken remains of the Pig Wings: these art-
works confront uswith life that has been created, in some
cases connecting the experience directly to the idea of
Bwhat if this was for my consumption?^ If the artworks
were not alive, grown through themethod ofmammalian
tissue culturing, those implications would be lost.
Concurrently English scholar Robert Mitchell argues
about TC&A’s Disembodied Cuisine28 that this effect is
valid also when the actual, living artworks are absent, as
Beven simply learning that such a project is Bout there
somewhere^ can produce a sort of adrenalized, excited
concern (or even crisis) on the part of some who read or
hear about this project^ ([46], p. 72).
In a sense, bioartists can get closer to biotechnology
than can philosophers of science, as they can demon-
strate biotechnology by producing their artworks. On
the other hand, the materially manifest nature of these
artworks can itself generate an ethical problem, as we
have seen. Philosopher of technoscience Alfred
Nordmann has recently pointed out how B[o]ne can be
prepared for the future without seeking to know what
the future will be like^ ([49], p. 88). Instead of striving
to imagine all possible or plausible futures, he argues,
we might start out by observing our present situation.
This is precisely what the TC&A seem to be doing:
materialising possibilities in our present that simulta-
neously carry visions for the future and show our tech-
nical and ethical limitations. Through materialising
technological utopia ad absurdum, sardonically show-
ing what could be achieved with current technology, the
TC&A are both performing and critiquing potential
usages of the technology [28]. We might consider these
artworks as a type of material technology assessment,
with an expanded license to speculate. As discussed
above in relation to Hasegawa, Dunne and Raby, such
speculation can be manifested through prototypes that
are not, in fact, alive, still giving room for visions of the
future. However, the presence or absence of a living
element does appear to make a difference.
As pointed out in the introduction to this paper, any
engagement with the ethics of bioart begs the question:
what does this art do? What difference does it make?
The effect or impact of an artwork is notoriously diffi-
cult to assess. However, the potential impact might be
suggested through looking at some of the properties of
the artwork: visceral, alive, other [46]. Not to be
touched, and when it is, fragile to the point of inevitable
deterioration. The audience’s role as contaminators of
the cells in the TC&A’s killing ceremonies may give rise
to reflections around the status of different classes of
organisms. It may make some of us more aware of the
everyday world around us. In the case of a moralist
response, that very viscerality is cause for concern.
Complete autonomism makes little sense in the case
of bioart, where concept tends to be at least as important
as form (see e.g. [46]). The idea of aesthetic autonomy
does not cover the critical and narrative potential of
biological artworks, and I have not found a single ex-
ample of a scholarly autonomist critique of bioart.
However, the idea of artistic licence, artists being
allowed to do things that would not be permissible in
other contexts Bfor the sake of art^, remains a frame of
28 In this piece, TC&A grew skeletal frog muscle cells into little
steaks and served them to eight selected diners at the L’Art Biotech
in Nantes, 2003. Mitchell is also referring to Beatriz da Costa and
Critical Art Ensemble’s Transgenic Bacteria Release Machine,
part of the GenTerra project.
Fig. 4 Ai Hasegawa, I Wanna Deliver a Dolphin, 2011. Exhibi-
tion photo from Grow Your Own… Life after Nature, Science
Gallery Dublin. Photo credits: Nora S. Vaage. Reproduced with
permission from the Science Gallery
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reference. Oron Catts, although now starting to describe
himself as a Bcontestable designer^ [55], has previously
often commented on how defining himself as an artist
and the work as art Bis the best place I can position it^ as
Bit gives me a license to do things in ways which are
very different than any other profession^.29 This idea
also importantly shapes the TC&A’s views of how one
should, and should not, engage politically and innova-
tively through artworks. Catts objects, for instance, to
ecological art presented as Bone of the tools to solve the
problem^, stating that it is Bbetraying the license that we
have as artists […] this instrumentalisation of art, re-
gardless if it’s for a good cause or a bad cause, it’s a
problematic way of positioning art^.30 Apart from this
notable inheritance from an autonomist view on art, we
can glean from the ethics of art framework the extent to
which different commentaries on bioart are moralist or
contextualist, and how this affects their view not just of
the artworks, but also of the topics they treat.
Any artwork made using biotechnology engages,
explicitly or not, with the societal context of the
biotechnosciences. Whether the artwork critiques cur-
rent procedures, poses questions concerning future ap-
plications of a technology or utilises the available tech-
niques as a medium to pursue aesthetic goals, it cannot
be said to have intrinsic value only. Although, as art-
works, their aesthetic expressions are part of what move
us, the societal context, the ethical implications and the
technological possibilities all play a role in the fascina-
tion this type of art holds for many of us. Zylinska ([78],
p. 156) has suggested that Bthe tactical effects of many
bioart projects lie in their ability to shift the discourse
on, and of, (bio)ethics^. Artist Boo Chapple [19], build-
ing on the 1917 essay BArt as Technique^ by Russian
formalist Viktor Shklovsky, has suggested that an im-
portant property of bioart is its capacity to Bmake
strange^ our familiar representations of the world, in
particular the laboratory and the biotechnological object.
This making strange, I suggest, can then be a factor in
making sense of the object or idea under scrutiny.
Can art contribute to moving boundaries, in individ-
uals or in society at large, as to what is ethically
acceptable? And if so, in what direction? It may well
be that artworks that stretch our moral perception can
indeed contribute to our more speedy acceptance of new
technologies and their potential usage. As Andrews has
pointed out, some of these artworks may Blead to greater
acceptance of biotechnology, because it makes it seem
like the technology is attractive, safe, or valued^ ([1], p.
127). Economic and social theorist Jeremy Rifkin has
argued that this kind of art is likely to Blegitimise the
idea of a new ‘artful’ eugenics movement^ [58]. He sees
it as mirroring a tendency for spectacular science, in
such projects as the Vacanti mouse with an ear on its
back, or goats producing silk in their milk. The TC&A,
as well as Kac and Critical Art Ensemble, are specifi-
cally mentioned as contributing to this trend. However,
Catts and Zurr share Rifkin’s distrust of spectacular
science and have repeatedly discussed how their art-
works ironically engage with the hype resulting from
such spectacles [14, 17]. Ożóg has pointed to the
TC&A’s endeavours to get the audience to engage with
the semi-living sculptures, precisely because Bdue to
their small size and the fact that they grow very slowly ,^
they Bare not spectacular in character^ ([51], p. 45).
However, within their ironic approach, the artists do
play upon the spectacular.31
Concluding Remarks
A fundamental ethical question, touching upon many
aspects of life, is: BShould we do things just because we
can?^Works of art, I argue, can contribute to an answer
by providing a materialised visualisation of the issue at
hand, a demonstration with different connotations and
aims than those of research, and invoking different
faculties (affect, emotion, reflection) in the reception.
At the same time, that very question is often asked in the
context of these artworks, precisely because the artists
and their collaborators are also Btampering^with nature.
There does seem to be a lot at stake here. Bioartworks,
and commentaries from the audience, can play a role in
widening or tightening the fields of possibility that
artists are trying to create awareness of, thus potentially
influencing future decisions as to what our society
should be like. As such, discussions raised by these art
29 Catts has a degree in product design, and his partner Zurr in
media photography, so their framing of their practice as art, at the
time they started tissue culturing, represented a conscious act of
self-positioning. Since then, Zurr has earned a PhD in Art Theory
and History, and Catts has a Master’s in Visual Arts. Research
interview with Oron Catts at SymbioticA, April 2013.
30 Research interview with Oron Catts at SymbioticA, April 2013.
31 Research interviews with the artists at SymbioticA, April–May
2013.
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pieces are closely interconnected with those of technol-
ogy assessment and philosophy of technoscience.
If people are confronted in an embodied way
with something they would not have thought of
themselves, it may spur them on in developing
their personal ethical framework [43]. Several art-
ists and hackers working with biology have
stressed that often, participants in interactive bioart
workshops might start out with an attitude of Blet’s
do this^, and only gradually become aware of
ethical issues inherent in what they are actually
doing.32 Exposure, then, can also lead to contem-
plation of the issues at stake.
In a contextualist view, the TC&A artworks’
ethical dimensions, including the problematic use
of FBS, add significantly to their ability to affect
and induce such reflection. These properties are
vital to the artworks’ capacity for raising discus-
sion around current ethical problems, questioning
what might otherwise be taken for granted.
Whether or not this is considered part of art’s
prerogative will depend on one’s ethical frame-
work. Therefore, awareness of how that framework
influences one’s opinions can bring increased
depth to discussions of the ethics of bioart and
its relationship with biotechnologies.
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